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ARGUMENT 
I. THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS PRIVILEGE CANNOT NOT BAR 
AN ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM. 
By definition, the tort of abuse of process relies on a party's misuse of the 
legal process. It cannot exist, therefore, if the judicial proceedings privilege 
absolutely protects a party's use of the process. In light of the fact that abuse of 
process is a valid tort in Utah, it is not surprising that Utah courts have never 
applied the judicial proceeding privilege to bar an abuse of process claim. 
There can be no reasonable dispute regarding the vitality of the tort of 
abuse of process in Utah. Within the last year, this Court has issued two separate 
opinions addressing abuse of process, Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, 
116 P. 3d 323 and Hatch v. Davis, 2006 UT 44, 558 Utah Adv. Rep. 25. In both 
cases, this Court addressed the tort of abuse of process without providing any 
indication that it intended the judicial proceedings privilege to impact a party's 
ability to proceed with an abuse of process claim. 
In Anderson Development, this Court reviewed a trial court's dismissal of 
an abuse of process claim. The claim was based on the filing of a lawsuit that 
Tobias alleged was a misuse of the process. This Court clarified the difference 
between the torts of abuse of process and wrongful use of civil proceedings, and 
provided a two-part test for abuse of process claims. Ultimately, the Court 
remanded the case to the trial court to apply that test. The judicial proceedings 
privilege never entered into the Court's analysis, however. This is particularly 
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interesting because the Court relied on the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, a concept 
that is conceptually similar to the privilege, to bar one of Anderson Development's 
claims. See Anderson Development at ^ [28. 
In Hatch, the Court also reviewed a trial court's decision regarding an 
abuse of process claim. As with the claim in Anderson Development, the abuse of 
process claim was premised on the filing of a lawsuit. Again, the judicial 
proceedings privilege was never mentioned in the Court's analysis. 
HCU cannot refer this Court to a holding from a single Utah case to support 
its position. Instead, HCU relies on dicta from unrelated Utah cases and holdings 
from other jurisdictions. In doing so, HCU effectively establishes that the law 
may differ from state to state, and that the privilege may be applied differently 
depending on the jurisdiction1. HCU cannot, however, establish that Utah law 
supports the trial court's decision. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT 
MOUNTAIN WEST DID NOT SATISFY THE ELEMENTS OF AN 
ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM 
Since the date of trial court's decisions, this Court has clarified the abuse of 
process tort. In the recent Hatch decision, this Court explained that the essence of an 
abuse of process claim is the perversion of the process to accomplish some improper 
purpose, and that the use of process "becomes actionable when it is used 'primarily to 
1
 There are countless cases from other jurisdictions in which Courts have specifically held that the 
privilege does not apply to abuse of process claims. See General Refractors Co. v. Firmeman 's Fund 
Ins, 337 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2003) (mere existence of abuse of process tort is evidence that judicial 
proceeding privilege does not apply); Goldstein v. Mitchell, 496 So.2d 412 (LA. Ct. App 1986) (holding 
that the judicial proceedings privilege does not apply to abuse of process claims.); Vallombroso v. 
Brockett, 1992 Conn. Supr. Lexis 1734, (holding privilege does not apply to abuse of process claims). 
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accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed." Hatch v. Davis, 2006 UT at f 34. 
The Court also explained that to prevail on an abuse of process claim, a party must prove 
(1) an ulterior purpose and (2) a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the 
regular conduct of the proceeding. Id at f36. Because there is no dispute regarding the 
general legal principles, the issue in this case is whether the trial court properly applied 
the law to the undisputed facts. 
A. Ulterior Purpose 
In Hatch, this Court explained that the ulterior purpose component goes to 
the "essence" of the tort, or in other words, the "tortfeasor's motive." Id at ^ [36. 
Interestingly, courts have provided very little analysis regarding the ulterior 
purpose component. For instance, in Hatch, this Court touched on the ulterior 
purpose component, yet focused on the willful act component. Based on the 
Court's analysis, one is left with the impression that the ulterior purpose 
component is the more easily satisfied component, while the willful act component 
is the sticking point for most abuse of process claims. 
In this case, there was ample evidence before the trial court regarding 
HCU's ulterior motive. It was undisputed that HCU's motive was to stop 
construction of the medical center. Without a claim in the lawsuit to title or right 
to possession, and without any legitimate interest to protect, HCU recorded the Lis 
Pendens. If the only proper motive for recording the Lis Pendens was not 
available to HCU, then its decision must have been born of an ulterior motive. 
This conclusion is supported by HCU's own statements. Time and again HCU has 
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admitted its motive: to stop construction of the project. (R at 468.). This motive 
was confirmed by the testimony of HCU's board member, Lynn Summerhays (R. 
at 385-3£6 and R. at 410.). 
These were the only facts before the trial court on the issue of motive and 
HCU presented no evidence that its motive was pure. Consequently, the only 
reasonable conclusion the trial court could have reached was that HCU filed the 
Lawsuit and recorded the Lis Pendens with an ulterior motive. 
On appeal, HCU now claims that its motive was pure, and that it filed the 
Lawsuit to protect its rights and recorded the Lis Pendens to give notice to 
prospective purchasers. See Appellee Br. at 17. There are two fatal problems 
with this argument. First, HCU was prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 
from providing notice of anything but claims that impacted title to the property or 
right to possession of the property. Second, HCU knew that SDCH was days 
away from deeding the property into the joint venture with Mountain West. There 
were no prospective purchasers, and HCU knew it. 
HCU also makes the somewhat puzzling argument that its motive could not 
be ulterior, because it admits its motive. There is a key problem with this 
argument as well. The issue is not whether HCU concealed its true motive; it is 
whether HCU employed a legal process for a purpose ulterior to that for which it 
is designed. If this argument had any validity, a party could misuse the process 
and avoid liability by simply admitting they were abusing the process. 
B. Willful Act 
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As explained by this Court in Hatch, the facts necessary to prove the 
ulterior motive and willful act components are closely related. 
The 'willful act' requirement is consistent with the notion that an 'improper 
act may not be inferred from the motive.' Hatch at [^40. 
The 'willful act' element can be understood as an obligation imposed on the 
complaining party to allege (or in this case prove) that the tortfeasor has 
confirmed through his conduct his improper ulterior motive for employing 
legal process .... In this respect, the 'wilful act' element exists to be in the 
service of the 'ulterior purpose' core that makes up the 'essence' of abuse 
of process. 
Id. at TJ40. Consistent with this concept, this Court has required "conduct 
independent of legal process itself that corroborates the alleged improper 
purpose." Id. at f39. 
In Hatch, this Court cites the facts in Templeton Feed & Grain v. Ralston 
Purina Co., 446 P.2d 152 (Cal. 1968), as an example of a corroborating willful 
act. In Templeton, a defendant used legal process to seize turkeys at the height of 
the Thanksgiving season in order to force payment of a debt, and then made 
payment demands. The Court explained that while the payment demands "were 
not integral to the proceeding that resulted in the seizure of the turkeys.. .they 
collaborated the perverse character of the proceedings. Id. at 155. Therefore, the 
acts together satisfied the willful act component. 
HCU's actions are analogous to the turkey example in Templeton. HCU 
filed its Complaint on January 10, 2000. While it had no legal right to do so, its 
admitted purpose was to stop construction of the medical center. Much like the 
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defendant in Templeton, HCU used the timing of the process to create undue 
pressure. HCU did not record the Lis Pendens at the time it filed its complaint, as 
is the custom when a party is truly concerned about notice to third parties. Rather, 
HCU waited until March 2, 2000, days before SDCH was scheduled to finalize its 
joint venture with Mountain West and Mountain West was scheduled to close on 
its construction financing. Following this tactical move, HCU's board members 
threatened Mountain West by telling it that this was just the beginning of what 
HCU was willing to do to stop construction. (R. at 385-386 and R. at 410). 
In this light, the timing of the Lis Pendens and the statements of Lynn 
Summerhays satisfy the willful acts component outlined in Hatch. Futhermore, 
they confirm the fact that the Lis Pendens was a carefully timed tactical misuse of 
the process to disrupt Mountain West's joint venture with SDCH, disrupt 
Mountain West's financing and stop construction of the project. 
C. Impact of the Lawsuit and Lis Pendens 
Mountain West provided undisputed evidence that the lawsuit and Lis 
Pendens effectively stopped the project. SDCH pulled out of the joint venture, 
SDCH did not deed the property to Mountainwest Properties and Mountainwest 
Properties' lender withdrew its commitment for construction financing." (R. at 
409) This testimony was confirmed by the testimony of George Bennett, president 
of SDCH. (R. at 416.) HCU did not dispute this testimony, and the trial court 
denied its motion to strike the testimony. 
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Based on the foregoing, there was competent, undisputed evidence that the 
Lawsuit and Lis Pendens disrupted Mountainwest's joint venture with SDCH and 
disrupted Mountainwest Property's construction financing. Any conclusion to the 
contrary is not supported by the record, and the trial court erred in its findings. 
III. MOUNTAIN WEST'S TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE CLAIM IS 
NOT BARRED BY THE JUDICIAL PROCEEDING PRIVILEGE 
A. The Lawsuit 
Utah courts have consistently held that baseless and unfounded litigation 
can serve as the basis for an interference with economic relationships claim. 
Therefore, the trial court erred when it ruled as a matter of law that unfounded 
litigation is privileged and cannot serve as the basis for a tortuous interference 
claim. 
Leigh Furniture v. horn, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), is controlling. Much 
like this case, Leigh Furniture is a case based on the filing of groundless lawsuits. 
In that case, Isom brought a counterclaim against the Leigh Corporation for 
intentional interference with contractual relations based on, among other things, 
groundless lawsuits filed by the Leigh Corporation. While setting forth the 
elements of a tortious interference claim, this Court explained that "unfounded 
litigation" satisfies the improper means component of a tortious interference 
claim. Id. at 308-09. In the process, this Court specifically addressed the judicial 
proceedings privilege and first amendment concerns. 
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In St. Benedict's Development Company v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 
P.2d 194 (Utah 1994), the Court confirmed that "unfounded litigation" can serve 
as the improper means element of an intentional interference claim. Id at 201. 
Since then, the Court has never indicated any intention to limit its holdings in 
Leigh Furniture and St. Benedict's Development in the manner advocated by 
HCU. Furthermore, the Leigh Furniture and St. Benedict's Development decisions 
are consistent with the great weight of authority on this issue.2 
Apparently recognizing the futility of the arguments it made at the trial 
court level, HCU now focuses on the holdings in Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251 
(Utah 1997), and Beezley v. Hansen, 286 P.2d 1057 (Utah 1955) to support the 
argument that Leigh Furniture has been impliedly overturned. This argument does 
not withstand any serious scrutiny, however. 
HCU relies on Beezly for the proposition that the filing of a lawsuit— 
however unfounded—cannot be the improper means necessary to support a 
tortuous interference claim. See Appellee Br.at 21. Reliance on Beezley is futile, 
since it was decided by this Court in 1955, twenty seven years before the Leigh 
Furniture decision. In Leigh Furniture, this Court expressly held that "unfounded 
litigation" satisfies the improper means component of a tortious interference 
2
 See Silver v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 598 (3d. Cir. 1990); Trau-Medv. Allstate Ins., 71 S.W.3d 691 (Tenn. 
2002); Guard-Life v. S Parker Hardware, 406 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1980); Coming Inc. v. SRV Biosystems, 
292 F.Supp. 2d 583 (D. Del. 2003); Cacique, Inc. v. Gonzalez,WL 609278 (N.D. 111. 2004); Mantia v. 
Hanson, 79 P.3d 404 (Or. Ct. App. 2003); Matsushita Electronics Corp. v. Loral Co., 91A F.Supp. 345 
(S.D. N.Y. 1997); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co,, 797 F.2d 70 (2d. Cir. 1986). 
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claim. Leigh Furniture 697 P.2d at 308-09. Therefore, Leigh Furniture is 
controlling on this issue and Beezley is no longer good law. 
Problems also exist with HCU's reliance on Price v. Armour. HCU 
suggests that Price v. Armour stands for the broad proposition that "the judicial 
proceedings privilege immunizes actions taken in a lawsuit from liability for 
tortuous interference. Appellee. Br., at 21. It does not. Price v. Armour addressed 
potential liability for defamatory statements made during the judicial process. The 
holding is limited to the privileged nature of defamatory statements, and does not 
even venture into the issue of unfounded litigation. The actual holding in Price v. 
Armour reads: 
It is essential that the privilege apply to all claims arising from the same 
allegedly defamatory statements in order to encourage full and free 
participation injudicial and administrative proceedings. We therefore hold 
that the judicial proceedings privilege protects against Price's claim for 
intentional interference with business relations. 
(emphasis added) Id. at 1259. On its face, the holding in Price v. Armour dealt 
only with claims based on defamatory statements. It did not attempt to overturn 
this Court's holding in Leigh Furniture, and therefore did not do so. 
B. The Lis Pendens 
The Lis Pendens not privileged for three distinct reasons. First, the 
improper use of a lis pendens is not privileged. Second, the Lis Pendens is an 
excessive publication, and thus any privilege that may have existed was destroyed. 
And third, even if the Lis Pendens is privileged, the privilege is qualified. 
9 
1. The Improper Use of a Lis Pendens Is Not Privileged Under Utah Law 
The judicial proceeding privilege does not apply where the statements at 
issue are made unlawfully, even if during or in the course of a judicial proceeding. 
As recently as August, the Court of Appeals held in Sorenson v. Barbuto, 2006 UT 
App 340, TJ22 (Utah Ct. App 2006). that the judicial proceeding privilege did not 
bar a claim against a physician for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
because the physician's "acts of communicating ex parte with defense counsel 
were not legally justified." Id. at %L2. 
The recent holding in Sorenson is consistent with this Court's holding in 
Hanson v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976). In Hanson, this Court held that 
filing a lis pendens was privileged in the context of a slander of title action. To 
reach that conclusion, however, the Court had to distinguish the facts in Hanson 
from the facts of Birch v. Fuller, 9 Utah 2d 79, 337 P.2d 964 (Utah 1959), where 
the Court held that a lis pendens could serve as the basis for a slander of title 
action in part because the lis pendens was not in accordance with law. Id. at 190. 
In Birch v. Fuller, the Court upheld a judgment for slander of title where evidence 
supported findings that defendants filed a lis pendens in bad faith and had no 
equitable or legal title to the property. Id at 964,65. Other jurisdictions have 
similarly determined that an improperly filed lis pendens is not privileged and 
have allowed tort claims, such as slander of title, based on a lis pendens.3 
3
 See, e.g., Warren v. Atkinson v. Fundaro,_400 So. 2d 1324,1326 (Fla. App. 1981) ("the filing of the lis 
pendens was not privileged since it was neither a proper notice of lis pendens nor did it involve the property 
in litigation"); Trotter v. Indiana Waste Systems, Inc., 632 N.E.2d 1159,1163 (Ind. App. 1994) ("a lis 
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HCU primarily relies on Bower v. Stein Eriksen Lodge Owners Ass 'n, 201 
F. Supp. 2d 1134 (D. Utah 2002) to support its position that even an improperly 
filed lis pendens is protected by the judicial proceeding privilege. See Appellee. 
Br. at 18. In Bower, just as Mountain West does, the plaintiff argued that Hanson 
supported their argument that an invalid lis pendens is not privileged. However, 
finding Hanson to be unclear, Judge Campbell elected to follow the Texas 
Supreme Court in Prappas v. Meyerland Community Improvement Ass % 795 
S.W.2d 794, 797-98 (1990), and held that even an improperly filed lis pendens is 
privileged. Bower, 201 F.Supp.2d at 1138. 
Judge Campbell's decision, however, is not consistent the recent decision 
in Sorenson or this Court's decision in Hanson. Mountain West submits that 
Judge Campbell should have turned to the authority that the Hanson Court found 
persuasive, Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal 2d 375 (1956), which held that a lis 
pendens is (generally) privileged under California law. However, an improperly 
filed lis pendens is not privileged under California law unless it identifies an 
action previously filed with a court of competent jurisdiction which effects title or 
possession of real property4. 
2. An Improperly Filed Lis Pendens Is Also an Excessive Publication and 
Constitutes Abuse of the Judicial Proceeding Privilege Under Utah Law. 
pendens notice is absolutely privileged ... if the party filing the notice had a sufficient 'interest' in real 
estate pursuant to the lis pendens statute that would justify the filing of the notice under that statute"). 
4
 See Palmer v. Zaklama, 109 Cal. App 4th 1367, 1380 (2003) (citing Cal Civ Code § 47(b)(4)). 
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Even if the Lis Pendens had been privileged, HCU destroyed the privilege 
through excessive publication. This Court has consistently held that "[statements 
that are otherwise privileged lose their privilege if they are excessively published, 
that is, 'published to more persons than the scope of the privilege requires to 
effectuate its purpose.'" Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, ^ [15, 20 P.3d 895; (quoting 
Debry v. Godby, 1999 UT 111, ^[21, 992 P.2d 979). "The excessive publication 
rule, in the context of judicial proceeding privilege cases, is to prevent abuse of the 
privilege by publication of defamatory statement to persons who have no 
connection to the proceeding." Krouse v. Bower, 2001 UT 28, [^15, 20 P.3d 895, 
900. Thus, Mountain West can show abuse of the judicial proceeding privilege 
where publication of the complaint "extended beyond those who had a legally 
justified reason for receiving it." Debry v. Godby, 1999 UT 111, | 21 , 992 P.2d 
979, 985 (quoting Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991)). 
As acknowledged by HCU, "[a] lis pendens is, in effect, a republication of 
the pleadings." Aplee. Br. at 17 (quoting Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 190 
(Utah 1976)). In cases where a party has claims that impact title or right to 
possession, Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 authorizes the filing and recordation of a lis 
pendens. HCU had no such right. Accordingly, the Lis Pendens was an excessive 
publication. 
This case is clearly distinguishable from cases in which this Court held that 
publication was not excessive. In Krouse, this Court stated that a demand letter is 
excessively published if "published to more persons than necessary to resolve the 
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dispute or further the objectives of the proposed litigation...," and held that 
sending demand letters directly to various homeowners (in addition to their 
attorney) was not excessive publication since the homeowners "had a clear legal 
interest in the subject matter of the letter and threatened lawsuit." Id. at ffl[15-17. 
Similarly, in Debry, this Court held that an attorney's publication of a letter to six 
people was not excessive where four of them had direct involvement in the case, 
one did not receive the letter, and one was the attorney's lawyer. Id. at ^22-24, 
985-86. However, by filing and recording the Lis Pendens, HCU published the 
Lawsuit to those with no connection to it, including Mountain West's construction 
lender, and thereby abused the judicial proceeding privilege through excessive 
publication. 
3. If the Lis Pendens is Privileged, It Is Only Qualifiedly Privileged, and 
Does Not Bar Mountain West's Tortious Interference Claim Where HCU Knew It 
Lacked a Legally Protected Interest the Property and Improperly Filed a Lawsuit 
and Lis Pendens. 
In Westfield Development Company v. Rifle Investment Associates, 786 
P.2d 112 (Colo. 1990), the Supreme Court of Colorado was asked to decide as a 
matter of first impression "[w]hether there is a privilege to file a lis pendens which 
constitutes a defense to an action based on intentional interference with a 
contract." Id. at 116. Noting that the states are splits on the issue, the Court 
decided that "a party has only a qualified privilege to interfere with an existing 
contract by means of initiating litigation and filing pleadings and notice of lis 
pendens" because "the policy of encouraging free access to the courts which is the 
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basis of an absolute privilege is outweighed by the intentional and improper 
interference with contract by means of litigation." A/, at 1117-18 Accordingly, 
the privilege only applies when "(1) the interferer has, or honestly believes he has, 
a legally protected interest; (2) the interferer in good faith asserts or threatens to 
assert it; and (3) the assertion or threat is by proper means." A/, at 1118 (citing 
McReynolds v. Short, 115 Ariz. 166, 564 P.2d 389, 394 (Az. Ct. App. 1977)). 
Colorado is not alone in refusing to afford an absolute privilege to the filing 
of a lis pendens.5 Additionally, Mountain West submits that qualifying the 
judicial proceeding privilege so as to allow a claim for tortious interference for 
filing an invalid lis pendens is justified by the facts in this case. By qualifying the 
privilege so as to require the good faith assertion of an interest in real property 
before the privilege will attach to a lis pendens, this Court may prevent tortious 
interference by means of lis pendens while largely preserving the privilege. 
IV AT A MINIMUM, THERE WERE ISSUES OF FACT THAT 
PREVENTED THE TRIAL COURT FROM DISMISSING 
MOUNTAINWEST'S CLAIM ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
As is established above, groundless litigation satisfies the improper means 
component of an interference claim. See Leigh Furniture and St. Benedict's 
See, e.g., Belliveau Building Corp. v. O'Coin, 763 A.2d 622, 639 (R.I. 2000) ("we believe that the 
recognition of a qualified privilege is also appropriate in [the lis pendens] context, one that a plaintiff may 
overcome only by a showing of 'actual malice'"); Warren v. Bank of Marion, 618 F. Supp. 317, 325 (W.D. 
Va. 1985) ("It is this court's position, however, that when all the interests involved are taken into 
consideration the filing of a notice of lis pendens is more appropriately characterized as a qualifiedly 
privileged occasion"); Kensington Development Corp. v. Israel, 419 N.W.2d 241, 244 (Wis. 1988)("the 
legislature has, in effect, modified this doctrine as it relates to the filing of a lis pendens and rendered it a 
conditional privilege"). 
14 
Development. Therefore, to defeat summary judgment, Mountain West was only 
required to raise issues of fact regarding the validity of the underlying Lawsuit . 
In the underlying Lawsuit, HCU sought relief based on four separate causes 
of action against SDCH; (1) Breach of Contract, (2) Breach of the Covenant of 
Good Faith and Fair Dealing; (3) Breach of Restrictive Covenant on the Use of 
Land, and (4) Declaratory Judgment (the "Lawsuit"). The first, second and fourth 
claims were dismissed in the underlying lawsuit by the trial court on summary 
judgment. The restrictive covenant claim survived based on perceived questions 
of fact. 
In this case, Mountain West conclusively addressed those perceived issues 
of fact, and established that the restrictive covenant claim was groundless as well. 
HCU claimed a restrictive covenant prevented SDCH (and Mountainwest 
Properties) from constructing the Medical Center. By its terms, however, the 
restrictive covenant was limited to a 
prohibition on the establishment of a commercial ancillary facility. 
A commercial ancillary facility is defined as including, but not 
limited to, commercial laboratories or x-ray, radiological imaging, 
physical therapy, pulmonary or cardiology testing or out-patient 
medical facilities or birthing centers, any of which are offered on a 
commercial basis to third-party users. This prohibition shall not 
restrict physicians on the land from maintaining or performing 
ancillary services for their own patients. This prohibition shall be a 
covenant running with the land and enforceable so long as Hospital 
Corporation of Utah or any other subsidiary of Healthtrust, Inc.- the 
hospital company continues to operate an acute care hospital 
adjacent to the property. 
6
 Without citing any authority, HCU now contends that litigation can only be groundless if the claims have 
been previously adjudicated and found groundless. There is no basis in Utah law for this position. 
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(R. at 385.) 
Through the affidavit testimony of Richard Vincent and Gordon Bennett 
(the CEO of SDCH), Mountain West established that the planned Medical Center 
would not have been a "commercial ancillary facility" as defined by the restrictive 
covenant. (R. at 409-410.) Rather, the Medical Center was simply a 47,000 square 
foot medical office complex. Mountainwest Properties never intended to operate 
any facilities on the Medical Center. Instead, it intended to lease space to tenants. 
Likewise, the Surgical Center that Mountain West intended to open in leased 
space within the Medical Center would not have been a "commercial ancillary 
facility" as defined by the restrictive covenant. Mountain West Surgical did not 
intend to allow any of its member doctors to provide the prohibited services on a 
commercial basis to "third-party users." The member doctors could only perform 
services on their own patients. (R. at 409-410.) 
These were the only facts before the trial court on summary judgment, and 
they were not disputed. At a bare minimum, Mountain West created issues of fact 
precluding summary judgment. Under no circumstances, however, did it fail to 
present evidence to support the elements of its interference claim. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED HCU'S MOTION TO 
STRIKE 
HCU claims that Mountain West utterly failed to respond to discovery. See 
Appellee Br. at 46. HCU's position, however, is contrary to the record. As 
Mountain West explained to the trial court, the discovery propounded by HCU 
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required Moutnain West to produce thousands of pages of documents. In an effort 
to respond to those requests, Mountain West worked for months to locate the 
requested information and to retrieve it from various locations throughout the 
country. The majority of the documents were in long-term storage in Kansas City, 
Missouri. Because many of the documents related to events that occurred several 
years ago, it took Mountain West months just to locate those documents. 
Mountainwest then spent a significant amount of time pouring through the 
documents and preparing them for production in this case. This was the sole 
reason for the delay in responding to HCU's discovery, and this fact was explained 
to HCU's counsel on numerous occasions. After a significant amount of effort, 
those documents were made available for defendants' inspection, copying and 
review. Mountain West also responded to the outstanding discovery requests. (R. 
at 452-459.) 
After Mountain West had compiled the documents, Mountainwest's 
counsel and HCU's counsel even worked on a draft protective order. HCU never, 
however, made any effort to inspect or copy the information. (R. at 530.) Further, 
while HCU may have at one time drafted and filed a motion to compel, that 
motion was never submitted to the trial court for decision. Rather, HCU waited 
for summary judgment to complain about Mountain West's participation in the 
discovery process. 
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These facts were clearly explained to the trial court. Therefore, HClTs 
current claim that Mountainwest did not participate in discovery is absolutely 
false. 
A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. 
HCU contends that trial court erred by not striking the affidavit of Richard 
Vincent pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Overturning 
that decision, however, would require this Court to determine that the trial court 
abused its discretion. In Utah, appellate courts 
[U]phold a trial court's denial or imposition of sanctions under rule 37 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unless the court abuses its discretion. 
Rule 37 allows a trial court to order a party to cooperate in discovery, see 
Utah R. Civ. 37(a), permits a court to impose sanctions if a party fails to 
comply with its order see id. 37 (b), and in some instances allows a court to 
sanction an uncooperative party without having first issued an order, see ic. 
37(d). However, sanctions under rule 37are not mandatory. 
Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1998). As is explained 
above, the trial court was aware of the facts regarding discovery and chose not to 
enter sanctions. Because there is no evidence that the trial court abused its 
discretion, there is no basis for this Court to overturn its decision regarding the 
affidavit of Richard Vincent. 
B. The affidavit of Richard Vincent did not lack foundation 
As an additional tactic, HCU claims that the trial court erred by not striking 
paragraphs 12 through 19 of the affidavit of Richard Vincent. This decision is 
also reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See In re General Stream 
Adjudication, 1999 UT 39, ^25, 982 P.2d 65. As is outlined below, there is no 
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basis for HCU's position and the trial court certainly did not abuse its discretion 
when it denied HCU's motion to strike portions of the affidavit of Richard 
Vincent. 
Paragraph 12 
In paragraph 12, Richard Vincent explained, "The lis pendens was 
discovered by Mountainwest Properties when its lender pulled a final title report 
as it was preparing to fund Mountainwest Properties' construction financing". 
HCU took issues with this statement claiming that Richard Vincent lacks 
foundation for the statements contained in paragraph 12. The fact is, as an officer 
of Mountainwest Properties, Richard Vincent was uniquely qualified to testify 
about how it discovered the lis pendens and how the lis pendens impacted 
Mountainwest Properties' construction financing. As a result, there was no basis 
to strike this testimony. 
Paragraph 14 
In paragraphs 14 and 15 Richard Vincent explained, "Through the lawsuit 
and subsequent lis pendens, HCU claimed that there was a restrictive covenant 
that prevented SDCH (and Mountainwest Properties) from constructing the 
Medical Center". 
HCU argues that this paragraph should have been stricken because 
Mountainwest Properties and Mountain West Surgical were not parties to the 
lawsuit. The fact that HCU challenged this testimony is puzzling for a number of 
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reasons. First, the testimony accurately summarizes the claims in the Underlying 
Lawsuit, as admitted by HCU throughout this case and the appeal. Second, this 
information was only included in the affidavit to provide factual context. If it was 
stricken, it would not have in any way materially impact Richard Vincent's 
testimony. 
Paragraph 15 
In paragraph 15, Richard Vincent explained, that by its terms, the restrictive 
covenant was a: 
Prohibition on the establishment of a commercial ancillary facility. A 
commercial ancillary facility is defined as including but not limited to 
commercial laboratories or x-ray, radiological imaging, physical therapy, 
pulmonary or cardiology testing or out-patient Medical facilities or birthing 
centers, any of which are offered on a commercial basis to third-party users. 
This prohibition shall not restrict physicians on the land from maintaining 
or performing ancillary services for their own patients. This prohibition 
shall be a covenant running with the land and enforceable so long as 
Hospital Corporation of Utah or any other subsidiary of Healthtrust, Inc-
the hospital company continues to operate an acute care hospital adjacent to 
the property. 
Paragraph 15 is simply a quote from the restrictive covenant. There was no 
claim that the covenant is not properly quoted and there was no rational basis for 
striking it from the affidavit. 
Paragraph 17 
In paragraph 17, Richard Vincent explained, "Mountainwest Properties did 
not intend to operate any facilities on the Medical Center. Instead, it intended to 
lease space to tenants" 
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As an officer of Mountainwest Properties, Richard Vincent is qualified to 
testify about the Mountainwest Properties' plans for the Medical Center. 
Paragraph 18 
In paragraph 18, Richard Vincent explained, "The Surgical Center that 
Mountain West Surgical intended to open in leased space within the Medical 
Center would not have been a "commercial ancillary facility" as defined by the 
restrictive covenant. Mountain West Surgical did not intend to allow any of its 
member doctors to provide the prohibited services on a commercial basis to "third-
party users". The member doctors could only perform services on their own 
patients. 
HCU claims the court erred because this statement contains a legal 
conclusion. It does not, and therefore, was not stricken. Richard Vincent merely 
explained the type of services Mountain West Surgical intended to perform. As an 
officer of Mountain West Surgical, he was clearly qualified to do so. 
Paragraph 19 
In paragraph 19, Richard Vincent explained, 
Following the filing of the lawsuit and recording of the lis pendens, it 
became clear that HCU would continue its efforts to interfere with the 
construction of the Medical Center. Following the filing of the lawsuit and 
recording of the lis pendens, I had a conversation with Lynn Summerhays, 
a member of Lakeview Hospital's board. Mr. Summerhays informed me 
that the lawsuit and lis pendens were just the first in a series of actions that 
HCU intended to take to stop construction of the Medical Center. He told 
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me that HCU would do whatever was necessary tie up the process and 
delay construction of the Medical Center at the SDCH location. 
This statement is simply a recitation of Richard Vincent's conversation 
with Lynn Summerhays along with Richard Vincent's personal conclusions based 
on that conversation. He has personal knowledge of those conversations and is 
therefore free to testify about the conversation. 
In short, the trial court was uniquely situated to make decisions regarding 
the admissibility of evidence. It chose not to strike the Affidavit of Richard 
Vincent. Because there is no evidence that it abuse its discretion, the trial court's 
decision must be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mountain West respectfully requests that this 
Court (1) reverse the trial court's decision that the Lis Pendens cannot form the 
basis of an abuse of process claim as a matter of law; (2) reverse the trial court's 
decision that testimony from a lender or title company was necessary to support 
Mountain West's abuse of process claim; (3) reverse the trial court's decision that 
Mountain West failed to establish the elements of an abuse of process claim and 
remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter summary judgment in 
favor of Mountain West on its abuse of process claim; (4) reverse the trial court's 
decision that the Lawsuit and Lis Pendens are privileged as a matter of law, and 
therefore cannot form the basis of a tortuous interference claim; (5) reverse the 
trial court's decision that Mountain West failed to factually support the elements 
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of an interference claim as a matter of law and remand this case to the trial court 
for a trial on the merits; (6) reverse the trial court's decision to use Mountain 
West's failure to meet certain discovery deadlines as a basis for granting HCU's 
motion for summary judgment, and remand this case to the trial court for a trial on 
the merits, and; (7) uphold the trial court's decision to deny HCU's motion to 
strike the Affidavit of Richard Vincent. 
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2006. 
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Attorneys for Appellants 
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